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THE PROTECTION OF THE EUROPEAN CITIZEN
IN A COMPETITIVE E-SOCIETY: THE NEW E.U.
UNIVERSAL SERVICE DIRECTIVE
Alexandre de Streel1
Abstract
A new regulatory framework for electronic communications (fixed and mobile
telephony, Internet, cable TV, …) is due to be applicable in the Member States of the
European Union in July 2003. This framework is composed of several Directives
whose one – the Universal Service Directive – regulates the retail markets and the
relationships between operators and end-users. The paper details this Directive and
reviews its three-pillars structure: control of undertakings with significant market
power, enhanced consumer protection, and guarantee of universal access to the most
important electronic communications services. The paper shows that the new Directive
is more an evolution than a revolution with regard to the previous regime. It
maintains the faith in the market to deliver the best possible deal to the European
consumers, and calls for a severe reduction of retail regulation and a more efficient
provision of the universal service. The paper concludes by advocating for a migration
of the concept of universal service from its liberalization origins to a European
citizenship context.
1. INTRODUCTION1
Throughout most of the twentieth Century the majority of European countries
had a fairly simple industrial structure and regulatory model for the telecom
sector and, more generally, for network industries. There was an identity that
existed between public service, monopoly, and public undertaking. Indeed,
telecom was considered as an economic public service and as such fulfilled
Alexandre de Streel
2 In particular, the three principles of changement, equality and continuity, see R. Chapus, Droit
administratif général, 14e Ed, Montchrestien, 2000. See also for the Anglo-saxon tradition: W. Wade,
Administrative Law, 8th Ed, Oxford University Press, 2000.
3 See in particular the Communication by the Commission of 30 June 1987, Towards a Dynamic
European Economy: Green Paper on the Development of the Common Market for Telecommuni-
cations Services and Equipment, COM(87) 290. As sated at page 3, the overriding aim of the
reform was to "develop the conditions for the market to provide European users with a greater
variety of telecommunications services, of better quality and at a lower cost, affording Europe
the full internal and external benefits of a strong telecommunications sector".
4 On the telecom reform and the 1998 regulatory package, see: J. Scherer (ed.), Telecommunications
in Europe, Sweet & Maxwell, 4th Ed, 1998; P. Larouche, Competition Law and Regulation in European
Telecommunications, Hart, 2000; I. Walden & J. Angel (ed.), Telecommunications Law, Blackstone
Press, 2001; C. Koenig, A. Bartosh, J.D. Braun (eds.), EU Competition and Telecommunications Law,
Kluwer, 2002.
5 Due to the primacy of the market principle, these safeguards were to be based on market
mechanisms. For example, consumer protection aims at improving the information of the
consumers to enable them to make better choice, or the provision of universal service should
be realised in the most efficient way, using auction if appropriate.
6 On the origins of the European conception of universal service, see: Council Resolution of
7 February 1994 on universal service principles in the telecommunications sector, OJ 16.2.94,
C 48/1; Communication from the Commission of 13 March 1996, Universal service for
telecommunications in the perspective of a fully liberalised environment – An essential element
of the Information Society, COM(96) 73.
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the principles developed by French administrative law2. Telecom services were
provided by a public monopoly which was able to cross-subsidise local calls and
rural areas with prices above cost levels for long distance calls and urban areas.
In the eighties, the European Commission, supported by some Members States
and part of the industry, initiated a brand new industry structure and
regulatory model, breaking the equation between public service and public
monopoly3. It maintained public service objectives, but radically changed the
way they would be fulfilled as the market was considered more efficient than
State. The telecom sector was thus progressively opened up to the full
liberalisation of 1998, and a new type of regulation (that ended with the so-
called 1998 regulatory package), aimed at ensuring a true single and effectively
competitive European market, was put into place4. Nevertheless, recognising
that even a perfectly competitive market could not deliver all public service
objectives, some safeguards (universal service, enhanced consumer
protection, …) were also established5. These safeguards, and in particular the
universal service6, were difficult to design because they addressed two very
different issues (the content of the public service and the means of its
provision) and were to be uniformly applied in all the Members States despite
their different economic characteristics and political preferences. Therefore,
for each of the two issues a right balance needed to be drawn between
European harmonisation and the flexibility left to Member States. It was
deemed appropriate, on the one hand, to ensure lots of flexibility with regard
to the content of universal service and only provide for a European minimum
The New E.U. Universal Service Directive
7 The EC Treaty, and in particular Article 86, already limits the flexibility left to Member States
for the provision of the service of general economic interest. They could only maintain monopoly
if it is necessary to ensure the financial equilibrium of the provider of the service of general
economic interest, see Recital 4 of the Directive 96/19 amending the Directive 90/388
Liberalisation, Corbeau C-320/91 [1993] ECR I-2533, para. 14; Albany C-67/96 [1999] ECR I-5751,
para 103 and 107; Glockner C-475/99 [2001] ECR I-8089, para 57. On Article 86 EC, see further:
D. Edward and M. Hoskins, “Article 90: Deregulation and EC Law”, Common Market Law Review,
1995, 157-186; F. Blum and A. Logue, State Monopoly under EC Law, Chancey Wiley, 1998; J.L.
Buendia Sierra, Exclusive Rights and State Monopoly under EC Law, Oxford University Press, 1999;
V. Auricchio, “Services of General Interest and the Application of EC Competition Law”, World
Competition 24, 2001, 65-91; S. Rodrigues, “Réforme des entreprises de réseau et services publics
de qualité: le mandat de Barcelone”, Revue du marché Commun, 2002, 291-298; V. Karayannis, “Le
service universel de télécommunications en droit communautaire: entre intervention publique
et concurrence”, Cahiers de droit européen 2002, 315-376. The Article 86 EC should be read in
cunjunction with Article 16 EC: K. Van Miert, “La conférence intergouvernementale et la
politique communautaire de concurrence”, Competition Policy Newsletter 1997/2, 1-5; M. Ross,
“Article 16 EC Treaty and services of general interests: From derogation to obligation?”, European
Law Review 25, 2000, 22-38. See also in general: R. Kovar, “Droit communautaire et service public:
Esprit d'orthodoxie ou pensée laïcisée”, Revue trimestrielle de droit européen 32, 1996, 216-242 and
493-533; C. Henry, Concurrence et service public dans l'Union européenne, Presses Universitaires de
France, 1997; R. Kovar and D. Symon, Service public et Communauté européenne: entre l’intérêt général
et le marché, Documentation Française, 1998; L. Flynn, “Competition Policy and Public Services
in EC Law After the Maastricht and the Amsterdam Treaties”, in D. O’Keeffe and P. Twomey,
Legal Issues of the Amsterdam Treaty, Hart, 1999, 185-199; L. Hancher, “Community, State and
Market”, in P. Craig and G. de Burca, The Evolution of EU Law, Oxford University Press, 1999, 721-
743; S. Rodriguès, La nouvelle régulation des services publics en Europe: Energie, postes, télécommunica-
tions, Technique et Documentation, 2000; E. Szyszczak, “Public Service Provision in Competitive
Markets”, Yearbook of European Law, 2001, 35-77.
8 The reform was also motivated by the Internal Market Program 1992 and the convergence
between the computer and the telecommunications sector (and the consequent fear of the
computer firms not to be able to do further business due to the legal monopoly in telecoms).
It was also explained by the desire of the European institutions to increase their role in the
economy via regulatory intervention (similarly, see G. Majone, La Communauté européenne: Un Etat
régulateur, Montchrestien, 1997).
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to be met by the individual State, but on the other hand, to limit more strongly
this flexibility with regard to the means of provision, in order to ensure
transparency and efficiency7. To sum up, the European conception of the
universal service is thus very peculiar because it was developed in a
liberalisation context and because it applies to the whole European Union,
which is a collection of heterogeneous States only mildly economically
integrated and on the verge of political integration.
From the policy point of view, the liberalisation and the regulatory model
change were justified in order to make the provision of public service (and
the subsidy system which underlies it) more transparent, more dynamic, more
efficient, and ultimately more democratic and in line with the principles of
good governance. It was made possible because the whole telecom sector was
no longer a natural monopoly (due to technological progress and the
consequent decrease in costs)8. From the legal point of view, the reform was
Alexandre de Streel
9 In particular Article 86 EC, whose far-reaching interpretation by the Commission enables it, acting
alone and without having to compromise with the Member States or the European Parliament,
to liberalise important sectors of the economy. This interpretation was challenged by some
Member States, but was upheld by the Court of Justice in France and Others/Commission (Terminal
Equipment Directive case) C-202/88 [1991] ECR I-1223 and in Spain and Others/Commission (Service
Directive case) C-271, C-281 and C-289/90 [1992] ECR I-5833.
10 The telecom liberalisation led to decrease in prices and improvement in quality: Communication
from the Commission of 3 December 2002, Eight Report on the Implementation of the
Telecommunications Regulatory Package COM(2002) 695, hereinafter the Eight Implementation
Report. For the overall effects of liberalisation, see also: Liberalisation of Network Industries:
Economic implications and main policy issues, European Economy, 1999/4; Working Document
of the Commission Services of 7 January 2003, The Internal Market – Ten Years without Frontiers,
SEC(2002) 1417. The performance of the service of general interest in the network industries
is monitored and reported every year by the Commission in an Annex to the report on the
functioning of product and capital markets (Cardiff Report), available at <http://europa.eu.int/
comm/internal_market/en/update/economicreform/index.htm>, according to the methodology
defined in the Communication from the Commission of 18 June 2002, A Methodological Note
for the Horizontal Evaluation of Services of General Economic Interest, COM(2002) 331.
11 Communication from the Commission on the Services of General Interest in Europe, OJ 26.9.96,
C 281/3; Communication from the Commission of 20 September 2000 on the Services of General
Interest in Europe, OJ 19.1.2001, C 17/4; Report of the Commission of 17 October 2001 to the
Laeken European Council on the Services of General Interest, COM(2001) 598; Green Paper
of the Commission of 21 May 2003 on the Services of General Interest, COM(2003) 270.
12 Communication from the Commission of 10 November 1999, Towards a new framework for
Electronic Communications infrastructure and associated services: The 1999 Communications
Review, COM(1999) 539.
13 Communication from the Commission of 26 April 2000, The results of the public consultation
on the 1999 Communications Review and Orientation for the new Regulatory Framework,
COM(2000) 239.
14 OJ 19.12.2000, C 365 E/198.
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based on the internal market and the competition provisions of the EC Treaty,
which in fact had included a germinal form of the regulatory model since its
origin in 19579. Given its success, the same new model was then progressively
introduced in other networks industries, such as energy, postal services or
railways10. Each time, the European institutions adopted a progressive
approach to give time for the sector to adapt and ensure the necessary
safeguards to maintain a satisfactory level of public service11.
But as the telecom sector evolves rapidly, regulation should be modified
accordingly. Therefore, back in 199912, the European Commission began to
consider a complete overhaul of the 1998 regulatory framework for two main
reasons: adaptation to market developments (in particular the increasing
competition) and adaptation to technological progress (in particular the
convergence between media, telecom and information technology services).
In July 2000, after an extensive consultation13, the Commission proposed a
package of several new Directives14. Most of the Directives were adopted by
the European institutions in March 2002 in the record time of 20 months,
The New E.U. Universal Service Directive
15 On the new framework, see: M. Cave and P. Larouche, European Communications at the Crossroads,
CEPS Report, 2001; P. Larouche, “A closer look at some assumptions underlying EC regulation
of electronic communications”, Journal of Network Industries 2002, 129-149; A. de Streel, R. Queck,
P. Vernet, “Le nouveau cadre réglementaire européen des réseaux et services de communications
électroniques”, Cahiers de droit européen 2002, 243-314; S. Farr and V. Oakley, EU Communications
Law, Palladian Law, 2002.
16 Commission Directive 2002/77/EC of 16 September 2002 on competition in the markets for
electronic communications networks and services, OJ 17.9.2002, L 249/21.
17 Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a
common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework
Directive), OJ 24.4.2002, L 108/33.
18 Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on the
authorisation of electronic communications networks and services (Authorisation Directive),
OJ 24.4.2002, L 108/21.
19 Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on access
to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and services (Access Directive),
OJ 24.4.2002, L 108/7.
20 Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on
universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services
(Universal Service Directive), OJ 24.4.2002, L 108/51.
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thanks to the political momentum of the so-called “Lisbon objective” for the
Union to become by 2010 the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based
economy in the world, capable of sustainable growth with more and better jobs and
greater social cohesion, which implies inexpensive, world-class communications
infrastructures and in turn, an up-to-date and future-proof regulatory
framework.
The new regulatory package15 is mainly composed of one Liberalisation
Directive16, adopted by the Commission on the basis of Article 86 EC. It mainly
codifies the previous liberalisation Directives that removed exclusive and
special rights in the electronic communications sector. The package is also
composed of four main harmonisation Directives adopted by the European
Parliament and the Council on the basis of Article 95 EC, and whose national
transposition measures are due to be applicable in July 2003. The Framework
Directive17 comprises the general provisions on the institutions and their co-
ordination to ensure an European regulatory culture, the provisions related
to the assessment of Significant market power (which is the threshold to
impose most of the regulatory obligations), and other provisions related to
facilities needed to operate in the market (numbering, naming and address-
ing, rights of ways, …). The Authorisation Directive18 organises market entry and
rolls back any unnecessary red tape. The Access Directive19 organises the
wholesale markets (relationships between providers of electronic communica-
tions networks and services) aiming at ensuring access and interconnection
between networks, and ultimately a true single and effectively competitive
market. The Universal Service Directive20, hereinafter the Directive, organises
Alexandre de Streel
21 In addition, the new package comprises also: a Data Protection Directive aiming at protecting
privacy within the electronic communications sector, thereby complementing the more general
privacy Directive 95/46 (Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the
electronic communications sector, OJ 31.7.2002, L 201/37); a Spectrum Decision aiming at co-
ordinating the management of spectrum across Europe (Decision 676/2002/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a regulatory framework for radio spectrum
policy in the European Community, OJ 24.4.2002, L 108/1).
22 Article 8 Framework Directive.
23 Articles 1 and 2 Framework Directive.
24 Article 4c Liberalisation Directive 90/388, as last amended by Directive 1999/64; ONP-leased
lines Directive 92/44, as amended by Directive 97/51; Articles 3 and 4 TV Standards Directive
95/47; Article 5 ONP-Interconnection Directive 97/33; ONP-Voice Telephony Directive 98/10.
25 Chapter III of the Directive: Regulatory controls on undertakings with Significant market power
in specific markets. This pillar is in fact the mirror on the retail markets of the Access Directive,
which applies to wholesale markets
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the retail markets (the relationships between operators and end-users) aiming
to ensure the best possible deal for European citizens21.
These Directives carry forward the regulatory model introduced since 1987,
and now clearly state that public intervention can only be justified in order
to ensure competitive markets in case of market power, to stimulate the
internal market and to complement the market to deliver public service
objectives22. Moreover, intervention should always be minimal and related to
the level of competition, flexible but harmonised at the European level and
technologically neutral. But the scope of the new framework has been
considerably extended in comparison with the 1998 framework as it now covers
not only telecommunications but also all electronic communications networks,
services and associated facilities, i.e. all networks permitting the conveyance
of signals (being wire or wireless, circuit or packet switched, used for telecom
or broadcasting services), all the services consisting of the conveyance of the
signals on these networks, and all the facilities that are associated with them
(like conditional access systems or electronic program guides)23. This
extension was justified by the technological convergence, the phenomenon
by which each type of service can be delivered on every type of network, and
the consequent need to regulate all technologies on an equal footing to
alleviate any regulatory distortion. On the other hand, the scope of the
framework does not extend to the content services such as broadcasting or
e-commerce transactions.
Obviously, this scope and these regulatory principles apply to the Universal
Service Directive, which focuses on the retail markets. The Directive, which
simplifies the 1998 regime contained in five legal instruments24, comprises
three very different pillars. The first pillar25 aims at ensuring effective
The New E.U. Universal Service Directive
26 Chapter IV of the Directive: End-user interests and rights, as well as Articles 33 and 34.
27 Chapter II of the Directive: Universal service obligations including social obligations, as well as
Articles 18, 31 and 32 of the Directive.
28 Article 4c Directive 90/388 as amended and Commission/France (Universal service in France) C-146/00
[2001] ECR I-9767, para 35. Tariffs’ re-balancing normally implies an increase in the charges
for access and local calls and a decrease in the charges for long distance and international calls.
See the Eight Implementation Report, p. 42 and Table 1 of the Annex 2. As of December 2002,
nine Member States considered that they have achieved full tariffs re-balancing.
29 On the different types of prices control and their welfare effects, see D.E. Sappington, “Price
Regulation”, in M. Cave, S. Majumdar, I. Vogelsang (eds.), Handbook of Telecommunications
Economics, V.I: Structure, Regulation and Competition, North-Holland, 2002, 227-286. He shows that
price cap regulation is in general more efficient because, by focusing more on the control of price
than the control of earnings, it provides stronger incentives for the regulated firm to reduce its
production costs and increase its operating revenues. As of December 2002, ten Member States
still regulate the retail prices of the incumbents, and all of them use a price cap mechanisms:
Table 1 of the Annex 2 of the Eight Implementation Report.
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competition at the retail level, and thereby providing for obligations to be
imposed on undertakings enjoying sufficient market power to be able to distort
competition and commit exploitative abuses of power at the expense of
consumers. The second pillar26 is a collection of heterogeneous provisions
aiming at guaranteeing proper functioning of the market and world-class
communications infrastructure by ensuring better information, better
regulatory mechanisms and the provision of basic facilities related to telephone
and media services. Finally, the third pillar27 aims at guaranteeing availability
of specified basic services, thereby imposing obligations on certain designated
undertakings. Therefore, the first two pillars mainly target improvements in
the functioning of the market, whereas the third one aims to complement this
market.
2. FIRST PILLAR: REGULATORY CONTROLS ON
UNDERTAKINGS WITH SIGNIFICANT MARKET
POWER IN THE RETAIL MARKETS
Controls of retail markets, and in particular price controls, have always been
at the forefront of regulation, as what ultimately matters is the service provided
to the end user. During the era of monopoly, retail prices were controlled or
actually set by the State and involved heavy cross-subsidisation. In the context
of full liberalisation, the Member States were forced to allow the incumbents
to re-balance their tariffs towards the costs28, so as to put an end to the heavy
losses of efficiency that were due to the cross-subsidies. But as the
incumbents maintained their control on a large part of the market, the prices
of their previously monopolised services continued to be heavily regulated via
different mechanisms (rate of returns regulation, price caps, …)29. The new
regulatory framework aims at an important lifting of retail market regulation
Alexandre de Streel
30 Conversely, the new SMP regime can be seen as a market-by-market sunset clause, based on
competition law analysis. For a detailed analysis of the new SMP regime: A. de Streel, “The
Integration of Competition Law Principles in the New European Regulatory Framework for
Electronic Communications”, World Competition 26, 2003.
31 The two first steps of the analysis are provided in Articles 7, 14 to 16 Framework Directive, as well
as in two Commission soft law instruments: Commission Recommendation of 11 February 2003
on relevant product and service markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible
to ex ante regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and
services, OJ 8.5.2003, L 114/45, hereinafter the Recommendation on relevant markets; and
Commission Guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant market power under
the Community regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, OJ
11.7.2002, C 165/6, hereinafter the Guidelines on market analysis. See also the Working Paper of
the European Regulators Group (which is composed of all the NRAs of the Member States) on
the SMP concept for the new regulatory framework, May 2003, available at <http://erg.eu.int/
documents/index_en.htm>. The application of the third step on the retail markets is provided
in Articles 17 to 19 Universal Service Directive.
196 Intersentia
because entry barriers to retail markets are very low (provided access to
infrastructure market is well regulated), hence sector-specific regulation is not
justified. Retail intervention should thus be limited to two specific cases:
presence of substantial market power or need to ensure the universal service.
The remaining part of this section focuses on the first case, by developing the
Significant Market Power (SMP) regime as it applies to retail markets.
The SMP regime is in fact at the cornerstone of the new framework, as it covers
generally wholesale as well as retail markets and triggers the majority of
regulatory obligations that can be imposed by a National Regulatory Authority
(NRA)30. It applies the three objectives of the regulation (effective competi-
tion, single market and consumers’ interests), but mostly aims at preventing
ex-ante that undertakings having sufficient market power will abuse it and
prevent or distort competition. The regime has been fundamentally modified
by the new Directives and aligned to antitrust methodologies, in order to
better reflect the economic realities of the markets (and their degrees of
competition) and to be more flexible. Under this new regime, the imposition
of obligations on SMP operators takes place in three steps: firstly, markets have
to be defined; secondly markets have to be analysed to determine if one or
more undertakings enjoy SMP; and thirdly obligations have to be chosen
among a menu provided in the Directives31.
The first step in the imposition of obligations is thus to define the relevant
markets in two sequences. The Commission periodically adopts a Recommen-
dation that defines, in accordance with the principles of competition law, the
product and service markets within the electronic communications sector, the
characteristics of which may be such as to justify the imposition of regulatory
The New E.U. Universal Service Directive
32 The first Recommendation identifies seven retail markets: Access to the public telephone network
at a fixed location for residential customers, and another market for non-residential customers;
Publicly available local and/or national telephone services provided at a fixed location for
residential customers, and another market for non-residential customers; Publicly available
international telephone services provided at a fixed location for residential customers, and
another market for non-residential customers. In addition, it identifies the market for the
minimum set of leased lines.
33 These three criteria are developed in the Recitals 9 to 16 Recommendation on relevant markets.
For an analysis of the criteria: A. de Streel, “Market Definitions in the New European Regulatory
Framework for Electronic Communications”, Info 5, 2003.
34 These principles may be found in: Section 2 Guidelines on market analysis, and Commission
Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law,
OJ 9.12.1997, C 372/5.
35 On European competition law applied to the electronic communications sector: J. Faull and A.
Nikpay (eds.), The EC Law of Competition, Oxford University Press, 1999, Ch. 11; L. Garzaniti,
Telecommunications, Broadcasting and the Internet – E.U. Competition Law and Regulation, 2nd Ed., Sweet
& Maxwell, 2003; P. Roth (ed.), Bellamy and Child: European Community Law of Competition, 5th Ed.,
Sweet & Maxwell, 2001, Ch. 14; R. Whish, Competition Law, 4th Ed., Butterworths, 2001, Ch. 23.
36 United Brands 27/76 [1978] ECR 207; Hoffman-La Roche 85/76 [1979] ECR 461.
37 Guidelines on market analysis, para 72-82.
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obligations32. In practice, the Commission selects the markets justifying ex ante
regulation on the basis of three criteria related to the presence of durable and
important entry barriers33, and then delineates the boundaries of these
selected markets on the basis of antitrust methodologies. Then, the NRAs,
taking the utmost account of the Recommendation and the Guidelines on
market analysis, define relevant markets appropriate to national circumstances,
in particular their geographical dimension within their territory, in accordance
with the principles of competition law34. If an NRA wants to define a product
or service market that differs from those of the Recommendation, it must
notify its intention to the Commission, which could oppose it.
Secondly, having defined the markets, the NRA analyses them to determine
whether they are, or are not, effectively competitive, which means to determine
whether one or more operators enjoy SMP on the market. In turn, this SMP
assessment involves determining whether one or more undertakings enjoy a
dominant position or could leverage a dominant position from a closely
related market. Under competition law35, a firm enjoys a dominant position
when, alone or collectively with others, it has sufficient market power to behave
to an appreciable extent independently of competitors, customers, and
ultimately consumers36. To determine whether a firm enjoys single dominance,
the NRA has to assess a number of criteria on a forward-looking basis: high
and stable market share around 40%, high barriers to entry and expansion,
absence of countervailing buying power, …37. To determine whether several
firms enjoy collective dominance, the NRA has to assess whether two or more
undertakings, albeit remaining independent, behave like a single dominant
Alexandre de Streel
38 Annex II Framework Directive; Guidelines on market analysis, para 86-106; Gencor T-102/96
[1999] ECR II-753, para 276-277; Compagnie Maritime Belge C-395/96, C-396/96P [2000] ECR I-
1365, para 39; AirTours T-342/99 [2002] ECR II-2585.
39 Guidelines on market analysis, para 118. On the proportionality principle, see: P. Craig and G.
de Burca, EU Law, 3th Ed., 2002, Oxford University Press.
40 A price is deemed to be excessive under competition law when it bears no relation to cost: General
Motors 26/75 [1975] ECR 1367, para 12; United Brands, para 251; Commission Notice on the
application of the competition rules to access agreement in the telecommunications sector,
hereinafter Access Notice, OJ 22.8.98, C 265/2, para 105-109. See also: M. Haag and R. Klotz,
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entity. This parallel behaviour may be due to structural links between the firms
(like agreements) or market structure such that companies align their
behaviours without any concerted practices (pure tacit collusion). In this latter
case, the market should present some particular characteristics such as
transparency, mature market, similar cost structure and market shares between
firms, possibility of retaliatory mechanisms, …38
Thirdly, if a defined retail market is not effectively competitive and the NRA
concludes that obligations imposed on the wholesale markets would not result
in the achievement of effective competition, internal market or citizens'
interests, it imposes regulatory obligations. Therefore, three conditions have
to be met before imposing obligation on a retail market: (i) the market should
present such characteristics as to justify ex-ante regulation; (ii) one or more
operator should enjoy a dominant position (or be able to leverage a dominant
position); and (iii) obligations on the wholesale market are inadequate to solve
the competitive problem. This third condition, which is an important
innovation of the Directive, is particularly relevant, as most anti-competitive
behaviours on a retail downstream market stems from an abuse of market
power on an upstream wholesale market. Hence, it is more appropriate to
regulate the upstream market, source of the problem, rather than intervene
in the downstream market, which is only its manifestation. The SMP regulation
on a retail market should thus remain exceptional and is justified only when
wholesale measures would either be too late or too difficult to implement due,
for instance, to the lack of transparency in the market.
If the conditions are met, the NRA imposes one or more appropriate
regulatory obligations on operators designated as having SMP. The obligations
can be chosen among the non-exhaustive list of Article 17 of the Directive.
They should be justified in the light of the three basic objectives of the
regulation (effective competition, single market, citizens' interests), based on
the nature of the problem identified, and proportionate, which implies that
they should be the least burdensome option possible to achieve the regulatory
aim39. The NRA could impose different types of price control. As under
antitrust law, it could prohibit anti-competitive practices, like excessive prices40,
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“Commission practice concerning excessive pricing in telecommunications”, Competition Policy
Newsletter 1998/2, 35-38.
41 A price is deemed to be predatory under competition law if it is below the dominant company's
average variable costs or if it is below average total costs and part of an anti-competitive plan, Akzo,
62/86 [1991] ECR I-3359 para 69-74; Access Notice, para 110-116; Statement of objections against
Wanadoo, 21.12.2001, IP/01/1899. The application of the Akzo criteria in multi-services industries
may be problematic, as it has to be decided if the average variable cost (the benchmark under
which the dominant firm could no go) should cover fixed costs and/or common costs. The
Commission considered that the benchmark should be the long-term average variable cost:
Commission Decision 2001/354, Deutsche Post, OJ 5.5.2001 L 125/27, para 35. See further: T.
Lüder, "A new standard for predatory pricing", June 2002, available at <http://europa.eu.int/
comm/competition/speeches/index_2002.html>; P. Nicolaides, “An Assessment of the
Commission Decision 2001/354 imposing fine on Deutsche Post for abusing its dominant position
in parcel delivers”, European Competition Law Review 2001, 390.
42 There is a price squeeze when the margin between the access fee on the upstream wholesale
market and the final price of the SMP operator on the retail downstream market is insufficient
for a reasonable efficient service operator to make a normal profit: Poudres sphériques T-5/97
[2000] II-3755, para 179; Commission Decision of 18 July 1988, Napier Brown-British Sugar, OJ
19.10.88, L 284/41; Commission Decision of 21 May 2003, Deutsche Telekom, not yet published,
IP/03/717; Access Notice, para 117-119; Statement of objections against KPN, 27.3.2002,
IP/02/483.
43 Upheld by the Court in Bodson 30/87 [1988] ECR 2479; Tournier 395/87 [1998] ECR 2521, para.
38; Lucazeau v. SACEM 110/88, 241/88, 242/88 [1989] ECR I-2811, para 25. The Commission
recommended the benchmarking for the interconnection charges on fixed telecoms networks
from January 2000 to February 2002, when it was deemed no longer necessary due to the
increasing availability of cost accounting systems: Commission Recommendation of 8 January
1998 on interconnection in a liberalised telecommunications market (Part 1 – Interconnection
pricing), OJ 12.3.98, L 73/42, last amended by Commission Recommendation of 22 February
2002, OJ 28.2.2002, L 58/56.
44 On the wholesale markets, the Commission recommends to use a LRIC methodology for the
pricing of interconnection (Commission Recommendation of 8 January 1998 on interconnection
in a liberalised telecommunications market (Part 1 – Interconnection pricing) at par. 3) as well
as for the pricing of unbundled access to the local loop (Commission Recommendation of 25
May 2000 on unbundled access to the local loop: enabling the competitive provision of a full
range of electronic communications services including broadband multimedia and high speed
Internet, OJ 29.6.2000 L 156/44 at Article 1(6).
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predatory prices41, or price squeezes42. Going beyond the remedies applicable
under competition law, the NRA could also impose a positive price control
with different methods: it can introduce benchmarking43 and setting prices
similar to those applied in similar competitive markets; it can set a retail price
cap; or with sufficient information about the actual cost, it can use them to
directly set prices, possibly relying on different accounting methods than those
used by the regulated operator44. As the SMP regime mainly aims at ensuring
effective competition, the retail tariffs control should ensure competition,
hence orientation of the prices towards costs. They should not directly
guarantee other objectives such as general accessibility and affordability of
certain services, hence tariffs below costs. To ensure effective price control,
NRA could impose the implementation of appropriate cost accounting
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45 See further the Study made for the Commission services: Andersen, Implementation of cost accounting
methodologies and accounting separation by telecommunications, July 2002.
46 Hugin 22/78 [1979] ECR 1869; Hilti T-30/89 [1990] ECR II-163, para 118-119, upheld in appeal
by Hilti C-53/92P [1994] ECR I-667; Tetra Pak II C-333/94P [1996] ECR I-5951, para 37 tying may
be abusive even where tied sales of two products are in accordance with commercial usage or
there is a natural link between the two products.
47 Article 19 of the Directive. Carrier selection refers to the possibility to use an alternative operator
for making calls than the operator renting the line, by dialling a short code before the called
number. In case of carrier pre-selection, the short code is registered in the user’s terminal, hence
should not be dialled for the alternative operator to be used. Under Competition law, the fees
for carrier selection and pre-selection charged by a dominant operator can not be excessive:
IP/98/430 of 13 May 1998 involving Deutsche Telekom.
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systems45, with specific format and methodology, whose compliance would be
verified by a qualified independent body. Going beyond price control, NRA
could also impose other types of obligations such as prohibition of discrimina-
tion between end-users or unreasonable bundling of services46, or any other
appropriate remedies.
Finally, the NRA can impose carrier selection and pre-selection. In this
hypothesis, the SMP regime is used in a peculiar and non-flexible way, as the
Directive determines in advance the market to be analysed and the remedy
to be imposed47. Indeed, if an NRA finds that an operator has SMP in the
market for the provision of connection to and use of the public telephone network at
a fixed location, it imposes carrier selection and pre-selection at a price that is
oriented towards cost and does not act as a disincentive for subscribers to these
facilities. Moreover, this provision, which applies to fixed networks, could be
extended to other networks (including mobile) under the general and more
flexible SMP regime.
The thrust of the Directive is thus a severe reduction of retail regulation.
Indeed, under the new regulatory model, markets should be left alone as far
as possible and a regulator should only intervene where competition is not
possible or takes time to emerge (i.e. where there are high and durable
barriers to entry), hence mainly on the wholesale markets. Clearly if regulatory
interventions were to be as intense as in the monopoly era, albeit in a modified
form, the liberalisation program would be rendered useless. In practice, it
remains to be seen whether NRAs will be ready to free retail markets from their
obligations, but that is certainly one of the best moves we could expect in
favour of consumers.
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48 Article 2 Framework Directive. For instance, a company requesting telecommunications services
to link its different offices is an end-user without being a consumer, whereas an individual
requesting a private line at home is an end-user and a consumer.
49 In particular Directives 97/7/EC on the protection of distance contracts and Directive 93/13/EC
on unfair terms in consumer contracts. On EC consumer protection law, see in general: G. Howell
and T. Wilhelmsson, EC Consumer Law, Dartmouth, 1997; S. Weatherill, EC Consumer Law and
Policy, Longman, 1997.
50 Recital 30 of the Directive.
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3. SECOND PILLAR: ENHANCED PROTECTION OF END-USER
INTERESTS AND RIGHTS
The second pillar of the Directive aims at protecting the interests of the end-
users of electronic communications networks and services. In fact, the entire
Directive and indeed the whole regulatory package pursue this objective, but
this second pillar is a heterogeneous collection of specific provisions aiming
at increasing transparency in the market, ensuring better regulatory mecha-
nisms, or the provision of additional facilities related to telephony or media
services. It creates rights for end-users (i.e. users not providing public
electronic communications networks or services) or sometimes for consumers
only (i.e. the sub-set of end-users that request communications services for
purposes which are outside their trade, business or profession)48. The
correlative obligations to these rights apply to all undertakings active on the
relevant markets, without any compensation mechanism. Moreover, this pillar
applies in addition and without prejudice to Community rules on consumer
protection49.
3.1. End-users’ rights to ensure better information and better choice
The Directive ensures transparency of supplying conditions (including tariffs
and quality of services) on an individual and a general basis, to increase the
ability of consumers to optimise their choices and thus to benefit fully from
competition50. These provisions are important as, like the first pillar, they
ensure proper functioning of the market supposed to be the route to deliver
the best possible deal to European citizens.
Firstly, consumers should have a contract with minimum specifications (Article
20). Subscribers to services providing connection and/or access to the public
telephone network have a right to a contract. Moreover, that contract should
specify at least the name and address of the supplier, the quality and the tariffs
of the services, any possible compensation scheme, the conditions for
termination, and the dispute resolution mechanism. In addition, when
consumers subscribe to other types of electronic communications services, they
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51 Member States can extend the scope of this provision to other end-users, in particular the SMEs:
Recital 49 of the Directive.
52 Names of the different undertaking providing the services, type of services offered and standard
contractual conditions, dispute settlement mechanisms, and information about rights as regards
universal service
53 See Annex III of the Directive: supply time for initial connection, fault rate per access line, fault
repair time, unsuccessful call ratio, call set up time, response times for operator services, response
times for directory enquiry services, proportion of coin and card operated public pay-telephones
in working order, bill correctness complaints.
54 For the principles of good governance, see: White Paper of the Commission of 25 July 2001 on
the European Governance, OJ 10.10.2001 C 287/17.
55 If necessary, Member States may extend the scope of this latter provision to cover disputes
involving other end-users, in particular SMEs. Moreover, as noted in Recital 47 of the Directive,
Member States should take full account of the Commission Recommendation 98/257/EC of
30 March 1998 on the principles applicable to the bodies responsible for out-of-court settlement
of consumer disputes, OJ 17.4.98 L 115/31.
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have no right to any contract but if a contract is concluded, it should include
the same minimum specifications51. Subscribers have also the right to withdraw
from their contracts without penalty upon notice of proposed modifications
in the contractual conditions.
Secondly, some general information52 related to use of publicly available
telephone services by end-users should be published either by the undertak-
ings themselves or by the NRAs (Article 21 and Annex II). In particular, to
fully benefit from competition, NRAs should encourage the provision of
information that enables a comparison between the different offers on the
market, for instance using interactive guides. NRAs could also require
undertakings that provide publicly available electronic communications
services to publish quality of service information, that are based on standard-
ised parameters53 if appropriate (Article 22 and Annex III).
3.2. Institutional provisions to ensure good governance
The Directive also transposes to the electronic communications sector some
new regulatory methods in order to improve its governance54. NRAs should
consult all the stakeholders (operators, manufacturers, end-users) and take
account of their views on issues related to end-users’ rights, in order to be able
to adopt better decisions (Article 33.1). In addition, co-regulation mechanisms,
like code of conducts and operating standards, could be used under the
guidance of the NRAs to improve the general quality of service provision
(Article 33.2). Finally, transparent, simple and inexpensive out-of-court procedures
should be available to consumers for dealing with unresolved disputes related
to issues covered by the Directive (Article 34)55.
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56 The Directive does not impose, nor prohibit, Member states to impose portability between a fixed
number and a mobile number: Article 30(1) and Recital 40 of the Directive. Under Competition
law, the retail fees for porting a number charged by a dominant operator can not be excessive:
IP/98/430 of 13 May 1998 involving Deutsche Telekom.
57 Recital 41 of the Directive.
58 Firstly, all consumer equipment intended for the reception of digital television signals must be
able to discramble digital TV signals according to the common European scrambling algorithm,
and display signals transmitted in clear. Secondly, any analogue or digital television set of a
minimum screen size (42 cm for analogue set and 30 cm for digital set) must be fitted with a
standardised open interface socket (like the DVB common interface connector) permitting simple
connection of peripherals and able to pass all the elements of a digital TV signal.
59 Articles 3 and 4a Directive 95/47/EC. See further the Communication from the Commission
of 10 November 1999, Report on the development of the market for digital television in the EU,
in the context of the TV Standards Directive 95/47/EC, COM(1999) 540.
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3.3. End-user rights to ensure availability of certain facilities related to
basic services
The Directive ensures also the availability of certain facilities related to
telephone service. In a sense, they force the bundling of these facilities with
the offered electronic communications services to guarantee a world class offer
and promote a true single European electronic communications market.
To decrease the costs of switching between telephone services providers, and
hence increase the competition between them, number portability (the possibility
of keeping one’s number when changing operator) between fixed numbers
or between mobile numbers should be available (Article 30)56. Moreover, the
wholesale price for the related interconnection should be cost-oriented and
the retail price charged to subscribers should not act as a disincentive to use
portability. As on-net and off-net calls' tariffs could be different and as the
portability of numbers will make the determination of the called network more
difficult, the Directive encourages the NRAs to facilitate tariff transparency
alongside number portability, to strengthen its impact on competition57.
Similarly, to decrease switching costs on the digital television market, and
guarantee effective competition and the fullest connectivity possible to digital
televisions sets, interoperability of consumer digital television equipment should be
ensured, but no use of a specific standard is imposed (Article 24 and Annex
VI)58. Thereby, the regime of the TV standard Directive is carried over59.
To ensure a world-class communications offer able to support interactive value-
added services, NRAs should be able to require that all public telephone
networks' operators make available to end-users tone dialling or dual-tone multi-
frequency operation and calling line identification within Member State and
between Member States, subject to technical feasibility and economic viability
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60 However, to ensure minimum regulation, each Member State may decide to waive this possibility
in all or part of its territory if it considers, after taking into account the views of interested parties,
that there is sufficient access to these facilities. In addition, soft disconnection may be imposed
on all operators, and not only on the designated universal service provider: respectively Article
29(2) and 29(3) of the Directive.
61 Under competition law, a dominant undertaking could be requested to provide the data on a
non-discriminatory and cost-oriented basis: see IP/97/292 of 11 April 1997  involving the Belgian
national telecom operator Belgacom, and ITT Promedia/Commission T-111/96 ECR [1998] II-2937.
62 See further the study for the Commission services: Analysys, Regulatory Framework and Market
Developments Concerning Directory Services in EU and EEA Member States, September 2002.
63 However, tariffs charged to parties calling from outside the Member State concerned need not
be the same as for those parties calling from inside that Member State: Recital 38 of the Directive.
64 On this condition, see: Commission Recommendation on the processing of caller location
information in electronic communications networks for the purpose of location-enhanced
emergency call services, to be adopted.
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(Article 29 and Annex I)60. Similarly, Member States should take all necessary
steps to ensure, particularly in the event of catastrophic network breakdown
or in case of “force majeure”, the integrity and availability of the public telephone
network and services at fixed locations, especially an uninterrupted access to
emergency services (Article 23). In addition, all subscribers to publicly
available telephone services have the right to get an entry in the universal
service directory, an access to the universal service directory enquiry service, and
an access to an operator assistance service (Article 25). Furthermore, in order to
ensure effective competition on the directories and directory enquiry services
markets, all undertakings which assign telephone numbers to subscribers
should give access to their data on fair, objective, cost oriented and non-
discriminatory terms61. Finally, in order to promote a European telephony
market, any restriction that prevents end-users in one Member State from
accessing directory enquiry services in another Member State should be
lifted62.
Similarly, to create this European telephony culture, all end-users from one
Member State should be able to access non-geographic numbers, including
freephone and premium rate, of other Member States where technically and
economically feasible, except where a called subscriber has chosen for
commercial reasons to limit access by calling parties located in specific
geographical areas63 (Article 28). In addition, all end-users across Europe
should be able to call emergency services free of charge by using the single
European emergency call number “112”, and be informed about this possibility
(Article 26). That implies that national emergency services appropriately
answer and handle these calls in a manner best suited to their organisation,
and that fixed and mobile networks’ operators make available caller location
to the extent technically feasible64. Moreover, Member States shall ensure that
the “00” code is the standard international access code and that all undertakings
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65 The ITU Recommendation E.164 assigned the code “3883” to the European Numbering Space.
See further: <http://www.etns.org>.
66 See in general on universal service: M. Cave, C. Milne, M. Scalan, Meeting Universal Service
Obligations in a Competitive Telecommunications Sector, Report to the Commission, 1994; OECD,
Universal Obligations in a Competitive Telecommunications Environment, 1995; M. Muller, Universal
Service: Competition, Interconnection, and Monopoly in the Making of the American System, 1997, MIT
Press; J.M. Cheffert (ed.), Service universel, concurrence et télécommunications, Cahier du Crid n 15,
Story-Scientia, 1999; J.J. Laffont and J. Tirole, Competition in Telecommunications, MIT Press, 2000,
Chapter 6; R. Crandall and L. Wavermann, Who pays for "universal service"? When telephone subsidies
become transparent, Brookings Institution, 2000; P. Choné, L. Flochel, A. Perrot, “Universal service
obligations and competition”, Information Economics and Policy 12, 2000, 249-259; H. Intven (ed.),
Telecommunications Regulation Handbook, 2001, available at: <http://www.infodev.org/projects/
314regulationhandbook>; M.H. Riordan, "Universal Residential Telephone Service", in M. Cave
et al. (eds.), Handbook of Telecommunications Economics, 424-477 and references cited therein; J.H.
Alleman and P.N. Rappoport, “Universal Service”, in G. Madden (ed.), International Handbook
of Telecommunications Economics, V.I, Edward Elgar, 2003, 315-336; J.R. Schement and S.C. Forbes,
“Universal service in the information age”, in G. Madden (ed.), International Handbook of
Telecommunications Economics, V.II, Edward Elgar, 2003, 234-250. On the new Directive: R.A.
Cawley, "Universal Service: specific services on generic networks – some logic begins to emerge
in the policy area", 2001, available at: <http://www.arxiv.org/abs/ cs.CY/0109063>.
67 This objective has been very well fulfilled as the penetration rate of fixed or mobile voice
telephony is generally above 95% across all the European regions. See EOS Gallup, Study on the
Situation of telecommunications services in the regions of the European Union, April 2000. See also:
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operating public telephone networks should handle calls to the European
telephony numbering space65(Article 27), the necessary interconnection arrange-
ments being governed by the Access Directive.
4. THIRD PILLAR: UNIVERSALITY OF ACCESS
The third and last pillar of the Directive aims at ensuring that all European
citizens have access to the indispensable services of the eSociety and no
unacceptable digital divide is created between the information “haves” and
information “have nots”, even though this will not be necessarily fulfilled by
the market alone. In particular, it guarantees access to the basic electronic
communications networks and services at an affordable price (universal service
and additional national mandatory services) and access to a minimum set of
leased lines at a cost based tariff. It also gives the possibility to ensure pluralism
and cultural diversity by guaranteeing an access to specified radio and
television broadcast channels and services (“must carry” rules).
4.1. Universal access to basic electronic networks and services: The
universal service and additional national mandatory services66
Article 3 of the Directive carries over the objective of the 1998 regime where
every European citizen had a right to have access to some basic telecoms
services at an affordable price67. It provides that “Member States shall ensure that
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Communication from the Commission of 25 February 1998, First Monitoring Report on Universal
Service in Telecommunications in the European Union, COM(98) 101; and Annex 1 of the Eight
Implementation Report.
68 See similarly Article 2.j Framework Directive.
69 However, as Laffont and Tirole put it (op. cit., note 66, 230), if network externalities may justify
subsidy for developing network or new services, this rationale is weaker in case of developed
network when the externalities have already been internalised by operators.
70 Article 3(2) of the Directive.
71 Respectively Article 1(2) and Article 3(2) of the Directive.
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the services set out in Chapter (II) are made available at the quality specified to all end-
users in their territory, independently of geographical location, and, in the light of
specific national conditions, at an affordable price”68.
The appropriateness of this very objective has been questioned by some
academics, in particular economists: why should the State decide what its
citizens need? Instead of subsidising telecom services used by the citizen with
social needs or living in remote areas, would it not be more appropriate to give
the monetary equivalent of the subsidy directly to the citizen, who could then
decide how to spend it. To address this critique, several economic and social
reasons may justify a universal service policy: scale economy, network
externalities69 (i.e. the fact that an additional customer on the network
increases the utility of all the customers, but is not compensated for that by
these others customers), merit goods, or the need to alleviate the exclusion
of some citizens from the eSociety. In any case, for the majority of the world
countries, universal service (albeit it can have very different meanings) is a
political imperative, the only question to be solved being how to ensure it in
the most efficient way.
This question is appropriately addressed by the Directive, which states that any
measure taken to guarantee universal service should be objective, transparent,
non-discriminatory, and proportionate70. It should also respect two important
but subtly different principles: no distortion of competition and minimisation
of distortions within the markets71. The first principle, which stems directly
from the EC Treaty, means that universal service measures may not distort
competition between undertakings active in the same relevant market. In turn,
this implies inter alia that all undertakings in competition could be designated
as a universal service provider, or that each provider incurring a net cost
should be compensated. At the same time, if the initial state of competition
may not be altered by universal service measures, markets are nonetheless
often distorted because some services have to be provided at prices that depart
from normal commercial conditions (below their costs) and therefore some
subsidies (involving some taxes) have to be paid. The second principle then
means that these markets’ distortions have to be minimised. This implies inter
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72 Recitals 4 and 23 of the Directive. One way to assess this market distortion is to compute the
shadow cost of public funds (i.e. the dead-weight loss associated with one Euro of general tax
revenue) linked to universal service obligations. Hausmann showed that the social dead-weight
loss associated with the possible financing of a specific subsidy (up to $2.25 billion a year) to
schools and libraries by long distance services in the US could equal to $1.93 billion a year, which
makes a shadow cost of public fund of .86, far above the average shadow cost of public fund of
.25 to .40. See J. Hausmann, "Taxation by Telecommunications Regulation", in J. Poterba (ed.),
Tax Policy and the Economy 12, 1998, NBER and MIT Press, 29-48. Nevertheless, as explained by
Riordan (op. cit. note 66, 438), this conclusion is very dependent on the assumption that the
market is not competitive; hence the producer loss due to the universal service taxes is important.
With another assumption on the market structure, the shadow cost of public fund may be lower.
73 Article 4(2) and Recital 8 of the Directive. Some flexibility is left to Member States, which may
allow a data rate below the upper limit of 56 kbits/s to exploit the capabilities of wireless
technologies, which may be of particular relevance in some future Member States.
74 It should thus be underlined that connection at fixed location does not mean connection via
fixed public network, but only connection at a specified address (see Recital 8). The signification
of fixed location in Article 4 of the Directive appears to be different from the one in Article 19
of the Directive that refers to fixed network.
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alia that the least costly way to ensure universal service should be chosen by
the Member State, or that in the case of compensation from within the sector,
the contributors’ basis should be as wide as possible72. This latter principle,
which is another important innovation of the Directive, should be seen as a
door for economic principles to enter the policy and regulatory arena.
The remaining part of the section firstly describes the content of universal
service (scope and quality specifications), then describes its means of provision
(designation of the providers, calculation of the net cost, and financing), and
finally reviews the measures going beyond the European minimum that an
individual Member State may adopt.
4.1.1. Scope of the universal service
The scope of the universal service is described in Articles 4 to 7 of the
Directive. Firstly, it comprises access for a connection to the public telephone network
at fixed location, allowing end-users to make and receive calls, fax, and data
communications. The data rate should be sufficient to permit functional
Internet access, taking into account prevailing technologies used by the
majority of subscribers and technological feasibility, hence it is currently
limited by the Directive to a single narrowband network connection at 56
Kbits/s73. As the Directive is technologically neutral, the connection at the
fixed location or address could be fulfilled via wire or wireless technologies
(including cellular) provided they allow call, fax and data communications
to be carried out and that the tariffs for outgoing and incoming communica-
tions are structured in such a way as to meet the affordability criterion74.
Moreover, Member States should choose the least expensive technologies
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75 Articles 12 and 16 Data protection Directive. The Directive should be transposed by 31 October
2003.
76 Nevertheless, to ensure minimum regulation, an NRA may decide not to impose these obligations
if, after public consultation, it considers that these facilities or comparable services are widely
available.
77 Recital 13 of the Directive.
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among those available because the provision of the universal service should
minimise market distortions.
Secondly, universal service comprises at least one comprehensive and regularly
updated directory, in a printed and/or electronic form approved by the NRA.
The directory should list the data in a non-discriminatory way, and abide by
the Data Protection Directive, which provides for an opt-in system for
directories produced or placed on the market after the entry into force of the
national transposition measures75. Moreover, a directory enquiry service should
be available. Thirdly, sufficient public pay telephones (that inter alia enable the
placing of emergency calls free of charge) should be available to meet the
reasonable needs of end-users in term of geographical coverage76.
Finally, disabled people should have an equivalent access to the above-mentioned
services (connection at a fixed location, directories and directory enquiry
services, public phone boxes) as that enjoyed by other end-users. For example,
specific services such as textphone for the deaf or speech-impaired people,
or billing in specific formats such as Braille for the blind or partially sighted,
could be made available free of charge77. Moreover, as specific measures may
be enacted to ensure that the disabled can take advantage of the same choice
of undertakings available to the majority of end-users, and thus benefit from
the forces of competition, Member States may give vouchers or subsidies
directly to the disabled. This is a very efficient way to ensure universal access
as it respects the freedom of choices of consumers and empowers them to
benefit from competition between firms.
As the universal service is an evolving concept, the Commission shall periodi-
cally review its scope in the light of social, economic and technological
developments, and possibly propose its re-definition to the European
Parliament and the Council. The Commission is committed to carry the first
review in July 2005 (one year before the general review of the whole regulatory
package) and in particular study whether the scope should be extended to
mobile telephony and high speed Internet access (Article 15). The twin socio-
economic criteria that usually justify universal service will guide the Commis-
sion in its review. Two questions will be raised: (i) will the lack of access to a
specific service risk leading to social exclusion and (ii) will the universal
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availability of this service convey a general benefit to all consumers due to the
positive network externalities generated (Annex V). Therefore, the Directive
builds in an adaptation mechanism that ensures, in an efficient way, that as
the eEconomy evolves, no European citizen is left behind.
4.1.2. Characteristics of the universal service
Having described the different services that form part of the universal service,
we should now turn to the price/quality characteristics these services have to
meet. In the European context, universal service implies accessibility but also
affordability, hence access prices that may be below costs and provision of
facilities to control expenditures. Moreover, it implies a certain specified
quality of service. On the determination of both of these characteristics,
Member States enjoy some flexibility that ensures, in the light of the
subsidiarity principle, that universal service fits national circumstances.
Firstly, tariffs of the universal service services should be affordable, in the light
of specific national conditions (Article 9). The criteria for determining
affordable prices are not specified in the Directives and should thus be defined
by each Member State. For instance, they may be linked to the penetration
rate or to the price of a basket of basic services related to the disposable
income of specific categories of customers. Particular attention should be paid
to the needs and capacities of vulnerable and marginalised groups. To achieve
affordability, Member States may require that the designated universal service
provider offer tariffs that depart from those offered under normal commercial
conditions (i.e. which are below costs), that they comply with a price cap, or
that they offer similar tariffs across the whole territory. Direct support (via
vouchers for example) may also be provided to consumers having low income
or special social needs. Among all these possibilities, Member States should
chose the combination that minimises market distortions. For instance, it has
been shown that self-selected tariffs (where the universal service provider
proposes a suite of tariff plans that consumers can choose depending on their
consumption pattern) may be efficient as it gives an incentive to consumers
to reveal their preferences and limit the subsidy to the ones really in need78.
Moreover, subsidies that are targeted to a specific group of citizens or specific
area are more efficient than a general geographical averaging. It might also
be appropriate to choose two different mechanisms for uneconomic areas and
for uneconomic customers in economic areas. In the first case, tariffs below
costs could be imposed to the designated operator(s), whereas in the second
one, vouchers could be distributed to those specified customers who could
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79 J.M. Cheffert, “Universal service: Some observations relating to future European debates”, Info
2(3), 2000, 241-249.
80 Phased payment for connection fees and pre-payment systems for usage fees, itemised billing,
selective call barring for outgoing calls, and soft disconnection. Nevertheless, to ensure minimum
regulation, an NRA should be able to waive these requirements in all or part of its national
territory if it is satisfied these facilities are widely available. Moreover, to limit the expenses of
the subscribers, designated undertakings could not force consumers to subscriber to additional
facilities or services which are not necessary or not required for the service requested.
81 See Annex III of the Directive, as explained in note 53.
82 Sanctions will be imposed in accordance with Article 10 Authorisation Directive.
83 There is no need to designate a universal service provider in part or all the national territory if
the market spontaneously fulfils universal service objectives or if the government directly gives
vouchers to the citizens who may then choose their provider.
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then themselves choose their providers and benefit from the competition79.
Moreover, as empirical evidence has shown, affordability is not only linked
to the level of expenditure, but also to the way customers can control it.
Therefore, the universal service provider should also offer at no additional
cost facilities that enable subscribers to monitor and control expenditure and
avoid unwarranted disconnection (Article 10 and Annex I)80.
Secondly, because quality is as important as price, quality information should
be available and credible performance targets should be imposed. Providers
of universal service have thus to publish adequate and up-to-date quality of
services information based on standardised parameters81, as well as any other
parameters developed by the NRA, which in particular take into account the
specific needs of disabled users. Moreover, NRA could set performance targets,
persistent failure to meet these would then result in sanctions against the
universal service providers82 (Article 11).
4.1.3. Designation of universal service providers
Having described what the European citizen is entitled to request, we should
now explain which measures Member States should take to live up to these
expectations. That implies answering two questions: which undertakings will
have to provide universal service and how these undertakings will be compen-
sated?
If necessary83, Member States may designate one or more undertakings to
guarantee the provision of universal service so that the whole of the national
territory is covered (Article 8). If it is deemed efficient, different undertakings
could be designated to provide different elements of universal service and/or
to cover different parts of the national territory. In order to fulfil the absence
of competitive distortion principle, the designation method should be
transparent, objective and non-discriminatory. Hence all undertakings able
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84 Similarly, see the Green Paper on Services of General Interest, para 79-83 and the rules contained
in the public procurement Directives (Directive 92/50 on public procurement of services,
Directive 93/36 on public supply contracts, Directive 93/37 on public work contracts, Directive
93/38 as last amended by Directive 98/4 on procurement procedures of entities operating in
the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sector, as well as the two remedies Directives
89/665 and 92/13) and Commission interpretative Communication on concessions under
Community law, OJ 29.4.2000 C 121/2. See further: Telaustria, C-324/98 [2000] ECR I-10745,
para 60-62: even if public service concession contracts fall outside the scope of the specific public
procurement Directives, the contracting entities are bound to comply with the fundamental rules
of the EC Treaty, thereby ensuring transparency and sufficient advertising for any potential
tenderer, to enable the service market to be opened up to competition and the impartiality of
procedures to be reviewed
85 On auctions, see further: V. Sorana, “Auctions for universal service subsidies”, Journal of Regulatory
Economics 18, 2000, 33-58; L. Nett, “Auctions: an alternative approach to allocate universal service
obligations”, Telecommunications Policy 22, 1998, 661-669 for a typology of auctions and the criteria
to be taken into account when designing an auction for universal service obligations. D. Weller,
“Auctions for universal service obligations”, Telecommunications Policy 23, 1999, 645-674 detailed
the proposed made by GTE in the US for an auction leading to in-market competition, but this
scheme was criticised by J.J. Laffont and J. Tirole, op. cit., note 66, 244-260.
86 R.A. Cawley, op. cit., note 66, 6.
87 As of April 2003, only two Member States have decided to compensate the universal service
provider (see also Table 10 of the Annex 2 of the Eight Implementation Report). France
provisionally estimated the net cost at 295.6 M euro for the year 2002, see the NRA Decision 02-
239, available at <http://www.art-telecom.fr/dossiers/index.htm>. Italy estimated the net cost
at 40.28 M euro for the year 2001, see the NRA Decision 14/02/CIR of 20 December 2002,
available at <http://www.agcom.it/provv/d_14_02_CIR.htm>. The United Kingdom decided in
1999 that due to the intangible benefits, there is no net cost. Spain decided in 2001 that the
estimated net cost incurred by the universal service provider, i.e. 268 M euro, did not represent
an unfair burden, hence should not be compensated.
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to provide the universal service (including mobile operators) should be able
to participate in the designation process and be aware of it84. In order to fulfil
the minimisation market distortion principle, the method should ensure that
universal service is provided in a cost-effective manner, i.e. in the least costly
way. In practice, a whole range of designation mechanisms is allowed from
direct designation to auctions and tendering (similar to public procurements).
Auctions can be appealing85, but may be problematic, due in part to the
difficulty of ensuring that sufficient undertakings are in a position to bid
against the incumbent (they would need to use alternative network technolo-
gies or acquire the use of the assets of the incumbent) and because of the
asymmetry of information (for example concerning the net costs or benefits
of serving groups of subscribers) between the incumbent and potential
entrants86. Therefore, they should be used only when there is already sufficient
competition on the local access market.
4.1.4. Compensation for universal service providers87
Once the providers of universal service have been designated, NRA shall
determine the net cost of its provision to ascertain to what degree it represents
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88 If the auction was flawed due to insufficient number of bids or asymmetries of information as
outlined above, the net cost does not necessarily amount to the bids received, hence should be
calculated separately.
89 The Annex III of the previous ONP-interconnection Directive provided that the costs and benefits
to be taken into account in the calculation of the universal service cost should be forward-looking
and not historic. This provision has not been carried forward in the new Directive, but is still
applicable as it ensures an efficient and least market distortive provision of the universal service.
See also footnote 44.
90 Annex IV, Part A and Recitals 19 and 20 of the Directive. On the costing methodology, see:
Communication from the Commission of 27 November 1996 on the Assessment Criteria for
National Schemes for the Costing and Financing of Universal Service in Telecommunications
and Guidelines for Member States on Operation of such Schemes, COM(96) 608; WIK, Study
on the Costing and Financing Universal Service Obligations in a Competitive Telecommunications
Environment in the European Union, October 1997; a summary of this study could be found in W.
Neu and U. Stumpf, “Evaluating Compensation Requirement by Telecommunications Universal
Service Providers: A New Challenge to Regulators”, Communications & Stratégies 1997, 165-181.
91 The calculation of the net cost is so complex that it may lead to widely divergent estimates. For
example, as of fall 1997, the per-line local loop forward-looking long run-run incremental cost
in the US has been estimated to $18.58, $29.14, or $41.12 depending of the model used (Laffont
and Tirole, op. cit., note 66, 237). On the use of proxy model to estimate the forward-looking cost
of various elements of the network from engineering data, see: W.H. Sharkey, “Representation
of Technology and Production”, in M. Cave et al. (eds.), Handbook of Telecommunications Economics,
in particular 204-220; Y.M. Braunstein and G. Coble-Neal, “Cost function issues and estimation”,
in G. Madden (ed.), International Handbook of Telecommunications Economics, V.I, Edward Elgar,
2003, 74-119.
92 The NRA should single out each element of the universal service that is compensated, calculate
it without any approximation or on a flat rate basis, and should take into account intangible
benefits even though they are difficult to assess: France/Commission (Universal service in France) C-
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an unfair burden for the undertakings concerned (Article 12 and Annex IV).
In order to do so, two methods could be applied depending on the designation
mechanism. If an auction or a similar method has been used, and provided
the procedure was sufficiently efficient88, the net cost is revealed during the
designation and amounts to the lowest bid received and selected. Otherwise,
cost should be calculated as such and corresponds to the net cost the
undertaking could have avoided, had it not been designated as a universal
service provider (net avoidable cost). Calculation of this is based upon the
costs attributable to those elements of the services or those specific end-users,
that can only be provided for at a loss or under a price structure that falls
outside normal commercial standards89. From these costs, the intangible
benefits (the estimate, in monetary terms, of the indirect benefits that an
undertaking derives by virtue of its position as provider of universal service)
should then be deducted90.
Therefore, when auctions are efficiently used, the determination of the net
cost is fairly straightforward, as it is revealed during the designation process
itself, similar to the calculation of the cost of a public procurement. Otherwise,
the determination requires a specific and complex calculation91, whose each
step needs to be verified by the NRA and made publicly available92. On the
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146/00 [2001] ECR I-9767, para 52-60-76. Due to insufficient compliance with the latter
condemning Decision, the Commission took a second action against France in 2003: IP/03/515.
See also: Belgium/Commission (Universal service in Belgium) C-384/99 [2000] ECR I-10633.
93 The NRA has some flexibility to determine when a net cost is such that it amounts to an unfair
burden, as for example it can decide that the net cost does not justify the administrative costs
of a specific financing scheme, see: Communication of 1996 on Financing of Universal Service,
op. cit., note 90, para 2.3.
94 Article 6(2) Liberalisation Directive.
95 This regime is evolving. In two recent cases, reverting the previous practice of the Commission,
the Court of First Instance judged that public financing which only compensated the net cost
of a public service obligation amounts to a state aid, hence should be notified to the Commission,
but could be allowed under Article 86(2) EC: FFSA T-106/95 [1997] ECR II-229, para 172-178;
SIC T-46/97 [2000] ECR II-2125, para 84. In a more recent case, the Court of Justice reverted
this case-law, judging that compensation that exactly matches the net cost of a public service
obligation does not amount to a state aid as it does not create any advantage that will distort
competition: Ferring C-53/00 [2001] ECR I-9067, para 27. In even more recent cases, the Advocate
General Léger advised the Court of Justice to go back to the previous position of the Court
of First Instance: Altmark Trans C-280/00, whereas Advocate General Jacobs suggested a
middle way depending of the designation methods of the undertaking having public service
obligations: GEMO C-126/01. See also the Working Document of the Commission Services of
12 November 2002 on Services of general economic interest and state aid, available at
<http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/state_aid/others/1759_sieg_en.pdf>; A. Alexis,
“Services publics et aides d’État”, Revue du droit de l’Union européenne, 2002/1, 63-107; D.
Triantafyllou, “L’encadrement communautaire du financement du service public”, Revue
trimestrielle de droit européen, 1999, 21-41.
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other hand, if the Member State directly subsidises end-users, the amount
cannot be part of the calculation of the universal service’s net cost, as no
burden at all is laid on the undertakings. This lack of flexibility may give
incentives to Member States not to use direct subsidies, because they could
not then be financed via a sectoral fund (sector-specific funding generated
from within the sector) and are therefore inevitably be borne by the general
public budget. This is unfortunate because vouchers may be an efficient means
of meeting universal service objectives.
When an NRA considers that the net cost represents an unfair burden93, the
providers of universal service can be compensated, upon request, from public
funds and/or funds from within the electronic communications sector (Article
13). In each case, the Commission should be notified of the compensation94,
which should be in conformity with Community law, in particular with the
State aid rules of Articles 87 and 88 EC95. Compared with the 1998 framework,
where the possibility of financing was limited to the sector, this increase in
flexibility allowing the use of general public funds should be welcomed.
Indeed economic literature has shown that, unless there are significant
inefficiencies within current taxation, a compensation via the general budget
is less distorting and more efficient than the use of a sectoral fund. This is
because the taxable basis is broader, thus the crowding-out effect of the taxes
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96 Liberalisation of Network Industries: Economic implications and main policy issues, European
Economy, 1999/4; See also note 72.
97 R.A. Cawley, op. cit., note 66, 9. Indeed, most of the relevant markets in electronic communica-
tions are national in scope: A. de Streel, op. cit., note 33.
98 Therefore, there is no link between the operators being able to receive compensation (the ones
being able to provide universal service’s services as defined in Articles 4 to 7 Universal Service
Directive) and the undertakings that should participate to the universal service fund (all providers
of electronic communications networks and services as defined in Article 2 Framework Directive).
99 Recital 23 of the Directive.
100 Annex IV, Part B of the Directive Proposal tabled by the Commission, OJ 19.12.2000, C 365 E/238.
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is accordingly smaller96. Nevertheless, some fear that this flexibility will
generate competitive distortions between Member States, and competitive
disadvantage for the countries using sectoral funds compared to those using
the general budget. Fortunately, such concerns are unfounded, as differences
in compensation mechanisms are akin to divergences in other economic
factors, such as the cost of labour or capital or the taxation regime, and the
universal service net cost burdens are small when compared with overall
economic activity. Moreover, undertakings in the sector generally compete
within national markets, even if communication is by definition an interna-
tional activity97. 
If a Member State decides to establish a sectoral fund, it should be financed
by all electronic communications networks and services operators who provide
services in the territory of the Member State establishing that fund, and
therefore includes operators of fixed telecoms networks, mobile services, cable
TV, and even Internet Service Providers98. The sharing mechanism should be
in accordance with the usual principles of transparency, non-discrimination,
proportionality, and least market distortion. To ensure least market distortion,
contributions should be recovered in a way that minimises as far as possible
the impact of the financial burden falling on end-users, for example by
spreading contributions as widely as possible among electronic communica-
tions operators99. On the other hand, to ensure proportionality and reduce
the burden on new entrants, Member States may choose not to require
contributions from undertakings whose national turnover is less than a limit
set by the State. To guarantee non-discrimination with regard to vertical
structure and hinder the sharing mechanism from giving the undertakings
any incentive to vertically integrate, the contribution method should avoid
any double imposition falling on both outputs and inputs, or any accumulated
impositions (e.g. service provider paying on the basis of its own activities and
in relation to inputs purchased from other operators). To alleviate this risk
without re-inventing the wheel, the Commission had suggested the use of a
VAT type mechanism100. Unfortunately, this proposal was not adopted by the
European legislator due to the (out-of-place) fear of the Council that Member
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101 Communication from the Council and Commission of 14 June 2000, eEurope 2002: An
information society for all; Communication from the Commission of 28 May 2002, eEurope 2005:
An information society for all, COM(2002) 263. The latter Action Plan aims at ensuring that
Europe has by 2005 modern online public services (e-government, e-learning, e-health) and a
dynamic e-business environment, which should be enabled by a widespread availability of
broadband and secure infrastructure. It is based on four inter-linked action lines: relevant policy
measures at EU level, exchange of best practices, benchmarking on a list of specified indicators,
and co-ordination mechanisms among Member States.
102 On this topic, see the study done for the Commission services: Empirica and WRC, Use of advanced
telecommunications services by health care establishments and possible implications for telecommunications
regulatory policy of the European Union, October 2000, and the different Member States initiatives
available at <http://www.europa.eu.int/information_society/eeurope/action_plan/ehealth/
index_en.htm>.
103 See also the Study on the effect of Information Technologies in the less advanced countries,
available at <http://europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/
rado_en.htm>; and the Member States initiatives available at <http://www.europa.eu.int/
information_society/eeurope/news_library/events/workshop/index_en.htm>.
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States’ tax prerogatives would be affected. Finally, to ensure objectivity and
transparency, the fund should be administrated by the NRA or an independent
body under its supervision, and a report giving the cost of the universal service
and the contribution of each operator should be published annually (Article
13.2 and 14).
4.1.5. Additional mandatory services that can be imposed by each
Member State
The universal service comprises a minimum, cornerstone-set of services that
should be available and affordable across the whole Community, and whose
net cost could be financed with the general budget and/or a fund from within
the electronic communications sector. An individual Member State may want
to go beyond this minimum set and decide to make additional services
available and affordable on its territory when markets do not fulfil the
perceived needs of the citizens. For example, in the context of the “eEurope”
action plans101, Member States may decide that schools or health care
establishments should have fast Internet access at a price below costs102, or that
broadband infrastructure should be rolled out in the less developed regions103.
In this case, any compensation mechanism should then abide by Community
law, in particular state aid rules, but cannot be financed from within the sector
(Article 32). Indeed, the use of sectoral funding should be limited, as
concentrating the financing of general service obligations on a particular
sector would create important market distortions and risk slowing down the
development of a fundamental sector of the economy.
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104 During the negotiation of the Directives, the inclusion in the scope of the universal service of
the low cost Internet access to some public institutions (like in the US) and of the broadband
Internet access for every citizen was heavily debated. Both suggestions have been rejected because
the use of sectoral fund to finance such services could lead to important distortions in the
markets. Therefore, the minimum data rate that universal service access should provide has only
be slightly modified: whereas the 1998 regime provided a data rate of 2,4 Kbits/s (Articles 2(3a)
and 5 ONP-Voice telephony Directive with a cross-reference to Annex I, Part I ONP-Interconnecti-
on Directive), the new Directive provides a date rate of 56 Kbits/s. On the welfare effects of an
inclusion of the Internet access in the universal service, see: J. Crémer, "Network externalities
and universal service obligation in the Internet", European Economic Review 44, 2000, 1021-1031.
105 1999 Communication Review, op. cit. note 12, para 4.4.1. See also the study for the Commission
services: WIK, Re-examination of the scope of universal service in the telecommunications sector of the
European Union, in the context of the 1999 Review, April 2000.
106 For example, there is no reason a priori why the Internet connections of a school should be
financed by the communications sector, instead of the education department of the government.
Moreover, the main costs to bring Internet to schools are related to the purchase of computers
and other hardware, maintenance and teachers training, and not much to telecommunications
access costs: M.S. Kosmidis, “Bringing the Internet to Schools: US and EU policies”, 2001 available
at <http://www.arxiv.org/abs/cs.CY/0109059>.
107 Study by Cullen & WIK, Universal Service in the Accession Countries, June 2000. To deal with the
problems of the heterogeneity and the different level of network development across Member
States, Hart proposed to group Member States into three different classes or scopes of universal
service – basic high quality services, state-of-art services, broadband for all –, each Member State
having a certain timeframe to fulfil the objective of its class. The system has the advantage that
all countries should realise the same effort (same relative progress), even if the absolute scope
of the universal service will vary among the Union. He proposed further the establishment of
a European Universal Service Fund: T. Hart, “A dynamic universal service for a heterogeneous
European Union”, Telecommunications Policy 22, 1998, 839-852. On the different stages of universal
service, see: C. Milne, “Stages of universal service policy”, Telecommunications Policy 22, 1998, 775-
780.
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4.1.6. Final comments
Therefore, with regard to universal service, the new Directive does not
introduce substantial modifications in comparison with the 1998 regime,
hence is more an evolution than a revolution. The scope of the universal
service has been made technologically neutral (the GSM could now be used
to fulfil its objective), but has been left nearly unmodified104. As the Commis-
sion indicated at the beginning of the Review105, an important extension of
the universal service was not considered appropriate for several reasons. It
could imply a financing by the electronic communications sector of some
services that are not linked to the sector and were previously not financed by
it106 and would substantially raise entry barriers, thereby slowing down the
emergence of competition (which is a good way to ensure public service
objectives), leading to a vicious circle where an extended universal service
would slow down its very provision. Moreover, any extension would not have
been sustainable for some of the future Member States where the telecom
networks are not yet fully developed107.
The New E.U. Universal Service Directive
108 J.M. Cheffert, “Universal Service: Some Observations Relating to Future European Debates”, 2001,
presented at the ITS 11th European Regional Conference and available at <http://userpage.fu-
berlin.de/~jmueller/its.html>
217Journal of Network Industries, Volume 4 (2003), No. 2
Some voiced concerns that the limited scope of the universal service indicates
that the European institutions, and in particular the Commission, would be
opposed to ambitious objectives for the eSociety. That does not seem to be the
case as the Member States keep all the necessary flexibility to enact policies
that reflect their political preferences and economic characteristics, provided
they use the general budget. The limited scope of the universal service
indicates only that the use of a sectoral fund, involving important market
distortions, should be limited. More particularly, some pointed contradictions
between the new Universal Service Directive and the ambitious eEurope 2005
Action Plan. Again, that is not the case as the Action Plan is mainly about
objectives and targets to be achieved by the Member States (for example
extensive roll-out of broadband), whereas the Directive is mainly about the
means to achieve any objective in the eSociety (by relying primarily on market
forces, and allowing States intervention only when necessary) and otherwise
set a European minimum for the public service.
With regard to the way universal service can be provided, the new Directive
reinforces and details the implementation of the principles of transparency,
non-discrimination and non-distortion of competition. More importantly, it
introduces a new and important principle with far reaching implications that
should lead to more efficiency: the obligation of minimising market distor-
tions. In this context, it also opens the possibility for Member States to finance
universal service with their general budget.
As stated previously, the European conception of universal service is about
the appropriate application of subsidiarity regarding its scope and means of
provision. If the flexibility left to Member States should be significant for the
former, it should be more limited for the latter. The new Directive goes in this
direction, even though it could perhaps have further constrained the power
of the State with regard to the means of provision108.
4.2. Access to the minimum set of leased lines
If universal service aims at ensuring that a minimum of three basic electronic
communications services (connection to the network, directory and directory
enquiry services and public phone boxes) are available at an affordable
price to consumers, the Directive aims also at guaranteeing availability at cost-
based tariffs of a minimum and harmonised set of leased lines across the whole
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109 Directive 92/44/EEC as amended by Directive 97/51/EC.
110 The set is published as part of the List of Standards referred to in Article 17 of the Framework
Directive. See Chapter 1 of the Annex of the Commission List of standards and/or specifications
for electronic communications networks, services and associated facilities and services (interim
issue), OJ 31.12.2002, C 331/32. The minimum set comprises seven types of leased lines: four
analogue types, and three digital types (64 Kbits/s, 2048 Kbits/s unstructured, and 2048 Kbits/s
structured).
111 Article 37(2) of the Directive referring to Articles 5 and 7 of the Decision 1999/468/EC of the
Council of 28 June 1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers
on the Commission, OJ 17.7.99, L 184/23.
112 Depending of the demand-side and supply-side substitutions, the NRA has to decide if each of
the technical type of leased line constitutes a separate market, or if some or all types are part of
the same relevant market. In the Recommendation on relevant markets, the Commission did
not identify specific market for each category of leased lines in the minimum set since it is likely
that the market structure will be similar for each sub-set. Moreover, as for every network
industries, the product market definition is stained with a geographical dimension because every
product is geographically bound. That geographical aspect of the product dimension should thus
not be confused with the geographical dimension of the relevant market: P. Larouche, “Relevant
Market Definition in Network Industries: Air Transport and Telecommunications”, Journal of
Network Industries 2000, 407-445; A. de Streel, op. cit., note 33.
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Community (Article 18 and Annex VII). Thereby, it carries forward the regime
of the ONP-Leased lines Directive109.
4.2.1. Scope and conditions
The minimum set of leased lines with harmonised characteristics is published,
together with associated standards, in the Official Journal of the European
Union110. These requirements can be adapted to technical developments and
changes in market demand by the Commission, acting with the Communica-
tion Committee (composed of representatives of Member States) in accor-
dance with the regulatory comitology procedure111. This minimum set should
be available across the territory of all Member States, but contrary to universal
service, should not necessarily be affordable for everyone. It should only be
offered in non-discriminatory and cost-oriented conditions, and technical
characteristics as well as supply conditions (including tariffs) should be
published in an easily accessible form. On the other hand, the provision to
end-users of leased lines outside the minimum set is covered by the general
provisions on retail markets control (the first pillar explained above).
4.2.2. Designation of the providers
The providers of part or all of the minimum set of leased lines are those
undertakings with Significant Market Power. In practice, NRA defines, in
accordance with the principles of competition law, the relevant markets that
cover the minimum set listed in the Official Journal112. Then, it determines
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113 Recital 28 of the Directive.
114 Article 1 ONP-leased lines Directive.
115 See the studies carried for the Commission services: Ovum & Squire Sanders, An inventory of EU
“must-carry” regulation, February 2001; Eurostrategies, Study on the assessment of the Member States
measures aimed at fulfilling certain general interest objectives linked to broadcasting, imposed on providers
of electronic communications networks and services, in the context of the new regulatory framework, March
2003; and also the Working Document of the Commission Services of 22 July 2002 on Must-carry
obligations under the 2003 regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and
services. See further: J. Capiau, “EC Must-Carry Rules on the Brink of a lost Opportunity:
Harmonisation and Free Movement of TV Broadcasts within the Communications Review”, Journal
of Network Industries 2001, 277-309; M. Libertus, “The EU Regulatory Framework for Electronic
Communications and the Commission Proposal for a Decision on a Regulatory Framework for
Radio Spectrum Policy in the Community: Concerns of and Consequences for public broadcasters
in the EU”, International Journal of Communications Law and Policy 6, 2000.
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if the market is effectively competitive, i.e. if no operator enjoys
SMP/dominant position. If the market is effectively competitive, no obligation
is imposed, the European legislator having concluded that the market alone,
without public intervention, is capable of providing the minimum set at cost-
based prices. On the other hand, if the market is not effectively competitive,
the NRA designates operators with SMP and imposes upon them the obliga-
tions described above. Contrary to the universal service, no compensation is
possible113 as leased lines are offered at cost rates, hence providers do not incur
any net cost.
Nevertheless, the use of the SMP regime to designate the providers of leased
lines is unfortunate and could lead to a deadlock. The SMP regime and its
associated obligations aim to ensure effective competition, or in other words,
that products and services that are offered on the market will be provided at cost-
based prices. It should not aim to guarantee the offer of specified products
or services, because if a product is not proposed on the market, then there
is no SMP operator and no competitive problem. Therefore, if the list of the
minimum set includes leased lines that are not offered, there is no SMP
operator, hence NRA cannot impose the provision’s obligations. It would have
been preferable to maintain the 1998 regime, under which the obligations
are imposed on the SMP undertakings, or where there is no SMP entity in the
market, obligations are imposed on any other operator114.
4.3. Access to specified radio and television broadcast channels and
services: “Must carry” obligations115
Turning to the media, Member States may decide that specified radio and
television broadcast channels and services should be available across their
territories to ensure pluralism and cultural diversity. If the market alone does
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116 It is mainly covered by national laws, but also by the Television Without Frontiers Directive:
Council Directive 89/552/EEC of 3 October 1989 on the co-ordination of certain provisions laid
down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of
television broadcasting activities, as amended by Directive 97/36/EC.
117 See in particular: Mediawet I C-288/89 [1991] ECR I-4007, and Mediawet II C-353/89 [1991] ECR
I-4069.
118 Recital 43 of the Directive.
119 Recital 44 of the Directive.
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not fulfil these objectives, governments may take measures to guarantee the
accessibility of these channels and services. These objectives as such relate to
content, hence are outside the scope of the new framework116. But to the
extent that Member States intervene and want to force operators covered by
the new framework (operators of electronic communications networks, services
and associated facilities) to carry certain channels, they should comply with
the Directives and could not impose any obligation not provided therein.
Therefore, Article 31 of the Directive states that "Member States may impose
reasonable must carry obligations, for the transmission of specified radio and television
broadcast channels and services, on undertakings under their jurisdiction providing
electronic communications networks used for the distribution of radio or television
broadcasts to the public". As usual, these obligations should comply with the
principles of proportionality, transparency and non-discrimination.
4.3.1. Scope: channels and services to be transmitted
Without prejudice to other Community rules, in particular the freedom to
provide services117 or competition rules, a great deal of flexibility is left to
Member States to determine which broadcast channels and services should
be transmitted to ensure pluralism as this is mainly a question related to
content. Nevertheless, Article 31 has set some limits, as it requires that
obligations should only be imposed for broadcast services, which may for
instance include teletext or services to enable appropriate access by disabled
users118, but excludes any services that are not directly related to broadcasting.
Moreover, to ensure transparency and proportionality, channels and services
to be transmitted should be specified and related to defined general interest
objectives.
4.3.2. Determination of the providers and possible financing
Must-carry obligations can only be imposed on operators of networks meeting
two cumulative conditions: a significant number of end-users of such networks
should use them as their principal means to receive radio and television
broadcasts. Currently, these conditions cover the traditional three broadcast
platforms, namely cable, satellite and terrestrial broadcasting networks119, and
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do not extend to DSL technologies or future 3G mobile networks. Therefore,
for all the other operators covered by the new framework, no must-carry
obligation could be imposed. In particular, no obligation may be imposed on
operators of associated facilities120. It was deemed unnecessary to leave this
possibility to Member States, as under the Access Directive121, broadcasters
could get access to associated facilities under fair, reasonable, and non-
discriminatory (FRND) conditions122. On the other hand for the operators
not covered by the new framework, every kind of obligation linked to pluralism
may be imposed subject to compliance with other Community provisions. For
instance, a Member State could impose “must-offer” obligations123 (i.e.
imposition to a bouquet operator to include specific channels in its offer), or
obligations relating to the presentation of broadcast content in listings and
navigation facilities, such as the prominence or visibility given to certain
broadcasters’ services via an electronic programme guide124.
The obligations imposed should be proportionate, i.e. pursue a legitimate aim
and use means that are both necessary and the least burdensome. That implies
that Member States should choose the most economically efficient way to
ensure universal access to the specified radio and television broadcast channels
and services. As economic theory has shown, one way to guarantee such
efficiency is to provide compensation to the network operator for the
transmission service it offers. This internalisation of the cost supported by the
network operator ensures that Member States and broadcasters will choose
the least costly way to reach the end-users. This compulsory compensation was
proposed by the Commission in its initial draft125, but unfortunately was not
adopted by the European legislator. The final text only provides that Member
States may decide to determine appropriate remuneration, but are not forced
to do so.
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To conclude, the “must carry” provision is an inevitable innovation of the new
framework that now covers all electronic communications networks, including
those used to deliver media services. Its implementation will be heavily
discussed as it touches on the delicate borderline between content and
infrastructure126, but it should be understood that it does not aim to reduce
the possibility for Member States to pursue pluralism objectives. On the
contrary, it secures these objectives and ensures they are fulfilled in a
transparent and efficient way to the benefit of the whole society.
5. CONCLUSION
The new regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and
services has been reviewed to adapt regulation to the development of the
economic and technological conditions within the markets (increasing
competition and convergence), while stimulating the emergence of a true
single market. Most of the new Directives are fairly innovative with regard to
the 1998 regulation (by facilitating entry and avoiding unnecessary red tape,
giving more flexibility to NRAs while at the same time ensuring a common
regulatory culture, or putting in place market-by-market sunset clauses based
on competition law principles). In that respect, the Universal Service Directive
may appear to be the least innovative one of the package, as it does not
introduce radically new thinking. Nevertheless, its three-pillar structure and
the provisions contained in each of these provide a great deal of helpful
clarification. It also introduces two important new principles that will hopefully
be properly implemented by the NRAs to the benefits of all end-users: a call
for a severe reduction of retail markets controls and a guarantee that universal
service is provided in the least distorting way. Fully applied, they will ensure
that the European universal service, and generally the protection of the
European citizen in the eSociety, is one of the most modern in the world,
thereby participating in the sustainability of the goals of the European Social
model promoted by the Lisbon European Council in March 2000.
More fundamentally, the new Directive carries forward the regulatory model
and its underlying assumption, introduced since the beginning of the
liberalisation program, namely that the market is in principle more efficient
than the State at ensuring services of general interest, and that public
intervention is justified only when there is market power or when the market
fails to deliver the public objectives.
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Some have criticised this approach as being too liberal and too Anglo-Saxon,
or as completely ignoring, if not reversing, more than three centuries of public
service tradition. Adopting a less dogmatic perspective, but still taking the
public service as the starting point, it appears that the new model has
modernised, improved and democratised le service public. Firstly, it has ensured
a cornerstone of public service that is common throughout the whole Union,
and could become the embryonic form of a European public service. It has
also clarified how this cornerstone is defined and reviewed, on the basis of
transparent and objective socio-economic criteria and after consulting all the
stakeholders. Secondly, it has ensured that the provision of this cornerstone
fulfils several principles relating to good governance: public consultation,
objectivity, transparency, non-discrimination, proportionality, non-distortion
of competition, and minimum market distortion. With the universal service,
the user is no longer treated as a passive receiver of goods and services that
have been decided by the State (very often via a public enterprise lacking full
legitimacy), but is rather treated as an active participant in an equal relation-
ship with a dynamic and responsive enterprise. But, the universal service was
developed in a liberalisation context, and therefore is regarded by many with
suspicion. Now that the European construction is at a crossroads, that a
Convention on the future of Europe and an Inter-Governmental Conference
is to decide whether the Union should move from economic integration to
political unification, it is time to recognise the value of the universal service
as such and to migrate this concept from its liberalisation context to a
European citizenship context127.
To conclude, the new regulatory framework for electronic communications
networks and services aims at ensuring an inexpensive world-class communica-
tions infrastructure across Europe, thereby contributing to the development
of a European eSociety to the benefit of all citizens. It follows the logic and
the principles developed a decade ago, and the Universal Service Directive
can be seen as its best and most obvious representation. Let us hope that this
new society is now ready to deliver on its promises!
  
